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In April 2013, the Indian Supreme Court decided Novartis AG v. 
Union of India.1 This case has sparked discussion surrounding the 
practice of “evergreening” in the pharmaceutical industry.2 The 
pharmaceutical industry’s unique characteristics promote this 
practice: Demand for pharmaceuticals can potentially be inelastic—
i.e., a drug’s price will have only a minor or marginal effect on 
demand.3 This dynamic can allow a pharmaceutical company to reap 
astronomical profits if they develop what is commonly referred to as a 
“blockbuster drug.”4 But blockbuster drugs are not common, and the 
 
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2015. 
1 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., (2013) SCR, Civil appeal No. 2728 (India).  
2 See, e.g., Dorothy Du, Novartis Ag v. Union of India: “Evergreening,” Trips, and 
“Enhanced Efficacy” Under Section 3(d), 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223 (2014). 
3 See SU LIU & DEBRAH CHOLLET, Mathematical Policy Research, Inc., PRICE AND 
INCOME ELASTICITY OF THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE X−XI (2006) (stating estimates of 
prescription drugs’ price elasticity range from -0.1 to -0.6 while also noting the price 
elasticity for specific drugs may vary). 
4 A blockbuster drug is “[a drug] that achieves acceptance by prescribing physicians as 
a therapeutic standard for, most commonly, a highly prevalent chronic (rather than acute) 
condition. Patients often take the medicines for long periods. And then there’s the financial 
component of the definition. A blockbuster drug is typically defined as achieving annual  
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costs associated with pharmaceutical development continue to rise.5 
Those costs are passed on to patients,6 a fact causing an access 
problem for patients with limited resources.7 
Broadly stated, “evergreening” is a range of strategies a patent 
holder can pursue to extend market exclusivity and elevate drug 
prices.8 One strategy available to a patent holder, called patent 
layering, is to patent a substance’s secondary aspects. In contrast to 
primary patents, which protect an active ingredient directly, 
secondary patents protect a range of chemicals related to an active 
ingredient, methods of use, alternate formulations, or dosages.9 One 
advantage of this strategy is that generic competition is deterred from 
market entry for the extended time period, keeping drug prices high 
while patients still purchase the drug’s name brand version.10 
Novartis interpreted section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act of 1970 
(as amended in 2005) as having the explicit purpose of deterring 
evergreening.11 The decision is fairly characterized as one reached 
with the goal of promoting access to pharmaceuticals.12 This Article 
examines Novartis in the context of pharmaceutical evergreening, and 
 
worldwide sales exceeding $1 billion. Those staggering revenues are generated by two 
components: the large number of patients who take the medicine and the premium price 
typically charged (compared to the older drug it replaced). Longterm use by patients, often 
consistent with guidelines issued by professional physician organizations, creates an 
annuity for the pharmaceutical company—at least until the patent protection runs out.” 
STAN FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN, REASONABLE RX 6 (2008). 
5 Jason Millman, Does it really cost 2.6 Billion dollars to develop a new drug?, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/18 
/does-it-really-cost-2-6-billion-to-develop-a-new-drug/?utm_term=.b31b852d429f. 
6 Dennis Thompson, What’s behind the sharp rise in prescription drug prices?, CBS 
News (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-behind-the-sharp-rise-in       
-prescription-drug-prices/. 
7 Sreedhar Potarazu, Rising cost of prescription drugs threatens health care gains, 
CNN (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/26/opinions/potarazu-drug-price        
-hikes/. 
8 Rajarshi Banerjee, The Success of, and Response to, India’s Law against Patent 
Layering, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 204, 207 (2014). 
9 Maria Sittler, Bronwyn Hall & Christian Helmers, An Empirical Analysis of Primary 
and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in Chile, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 
WORKING PAPER 20995, at 2. 
10 Gretchen Morgenson, Working to Lower Drug Costs by Challenging Questionable 
Patents, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/business 
/working-to-lower-drug-costs-by-challenging-questionable-patents.html?_r=0. 
11 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., (2013) SCR, Civil appeal No. 2728, 11, 48 
(India). 
12 See Du, supra note 2, at 255−57. 
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suggests that the U.S. intellectual property regime could be improved 
by adopting a provision similar to section 3(d). Part I discusses 
evergreening and the negative repercussions it has on both the U.S. 
patent system and society. Part II examines Novartis and the 
academic understanding of section 3(d)’s solution to evergreening. 
Part III briefly details the current state of pharmaceutical patent laws 
in the U.S. Finally, Part IV suggests what a similar provision in the 
U.S. system would look like. 
I 
EVERGREENING EXPLAINED 
“Evergreening” is a series of legal strategies to extend market 
exclusivity on expiring patents.13 Pharmaceutical companies can 
patent the active ingredient of a drug, an action providing protection 
for a term of twenty years.14 When a profitable drug nears the end of 
its patent protection, the patent holder must determine how to 
maintain profits or else allow generic competition to enter the market, 
an event that can drastically lower profits.15 One strategy is to patent a 
drug’s secondary characteristics in anticipation of the initial patent 
term’s end, creating a “patent portfolio.”16 For example, an original 
patent holder might obtain a secondary patent on a slight variation of 
the original substance, its medical uses, particular formulations of the 
substance, dosage regimens, or production processes.17 This strategy, 
called patent layering, benefits the patent holder because the 
secondary patents can effectively extend patent protection and deter 
generic market entry, keeping drug prices high.18 
Following Novartis, there has been increased discussion of patent 
layering, with authors asserting both that this strategy is a burden on 
the patent system and that the strategy itself cannot exist as 
 
13 Banerjee, supra note 8, at 207. 
14 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, 41 (2002). 
15 See Morgenson, supra note 10. 
16 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 620−21 (2011). 
17 Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and 
Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of ‘‘Secondary’’ Pharmaceutical Patents PLoS 
ONE 7(12): e49470 (2012). 
18 Scott C. Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and 
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336 (2012). 
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described.19 The debate on whether patent layering should be 
sustainable centers primarily on whether the secondary patents 
advance innovation.20 If the secondary patents advance innovation, 
then the argument is that the strategy is beneficial.21 In contrast, if the 
secondary patent does not reflect an innovation relative to the original 
substance, then the strategy of filing secondary patents is an abuse of 
the patent system.22 
Some commenters have pointed out that patents that do not cover 
an advance over the prior substance are not valid, so no protection can 
be gained by filing such a patent.23 Empirical studies suggest 
otherwise and indicate that the strategy of filing secondary patents has 
increased over time even though the patents sought consistently lack 
merit.24 These studies suggest that the number of patents attached to a 
drug have increased over the last several decades.25 For instance, 
between 1985 and 1987, FDA-approved pharmaceuticals had an 
average of 1.9 patents per drug.26 In contrast, between 2000 and 2002, 
FDA-approved pharmaceuticals had an average of 3.9 patents.27 Thus, 
the median number of patents per drug rose by one, from 1.5 to 2.5 in 
a fifteen-year period of time.28 This results in an increase in nominal 
patent life, i.e., the length of time the drug should be protected from 
infringement if it were not challenged.29 
However, the presence of additional patents greatly increased the 
chance of a patent challenge being filed.30 Further, the number of 
secondary patents is correlated with a higher likelihood of challenge 
and eventual invalidity.31 Though the average nominal patent term has 
 
19 Banerjee, supra note 8, at 208−10; Du, supra note 2, at 238−41. 
20 Banerjee, supra note 8, at 208−09. 
21 Du, supra note 2, at 239. 
22 Banerjee, supra note 8, at 208−09. 
23 See, e.g., Du, supra note 2, at 239−41. 
24 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 16; FTC, supra note 14, at iii−iv. 
25 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 16. 
26 Id. at 620. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 629 (explaining that for drugs that had both a patent to their active ingredient 
and a patent on a non-active ingredient [a secondary patent], the average nominal patent 
term added by the secondary patent is 1.9 years). 
30 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 18, at 21 (stating of the patents challenged in the 
study, eighty percent were made against the patents covering the non-active ingredient). 
31 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 16, at 633. 
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increased, the actual effective market life of a patent has remained 
stable.32 This data suggests that generic firms challenge the weakest 
patents: those that occur after the original patent, extend nominal 
patent term, and cover a non-active ingredient of the original 
compound. 
Even if a court eventually invalidates a secondary patent, a 
secondary patent can give a patent holder the benefits of a valid patent 
for an extended time, exposing several ways in which the strategy can 
negatively affect the patent system and society: First, evergreening 
creates an inefficiency in the legal system. Several aspects of the 
patent system effectively protect an invalid patent prior to and during 
the litigation process. For example, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a 
secondary patent may trigger an automatic 30-month stay on generic 
approval and these 30-month stays can be layered by filing additional 
patents after a generic company files its paragraph IV certificate.33 
Additionally, under the “doctrine of equivalents,” the holder of a 
patent on a peripheral aspect of a drug may sue for infringement as if 
the infringement were made against the active ingredient in the 
drug.34 
While courts typically invalidate secondary patents, the litigation 
can be expensive and potentially cost-prohibitive for a generic drug 
producer to pursue.35 When determining whether or not to enter the 
market with a generic drug that is arguably already covered by a 
secondary patent, a generic drug producer’s choices are to pursue a 
“Paragraph IV certification,” risk releasing a generic version of the 
drug and being sued for patent infringement, or not enter the market.36 
Litigating the validity of a patent can be intensive and time- 
consuming. For example, the expense of litigating a Paragraph IV 
challenge can be in the millions of dollars.37 The length of time that 
litigation can take may also deter generic manufacturers from 
 
32 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 18, at 25. 
33 FTC, supra note 14, at 43−44. 
34 Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: 
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence 
Requirement, 66 SMU L. REV. 59, 104−06 (2013). 
35 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 16, at 618. 
36 Id. (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act allows for a generic manufacturer to file 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) which contains a Paragraph IV 
certification that any number of the listed patents are invalid or will not be infringed by the 
generic’s entry into the market prior to the expiration of the drug’s patents). 
37 Id. 
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challenging pharmaceutical patents. By the time that the litigation is 
resolved, the secondary patent may have expired, essentially granting 
the effect of a valid patent to the non-generic drug producer.38 
Evergreening also allows for protection during the litigation process, 
a process which is structurally favorable to the patent holder.39 Patent 
litigation in the pharmaceutical industry is notoriously risky and 
resource intensive, and it becomes more so where more patents and 
claims are involved.40 The high risk of trying to litigate against those 
with systemic advantages eliminates potential challengers without the 
resources to wage multiyear patent battles.41 
Second, evergreening may be contributing to inefficiencies in the 
patent application process. This problem stems in part from the fact 
that the USPTO is understaffed.42 Consequently, there is currently a 
three-year backlog at the USPTO.43 The combination of the USPTO 
being understaffed and the backlog can allow for patent approval that 
would otherwise not be granted after a perfunctory analysis, inflating 
the number of patents and allowing for abuse.44 While evergreening is 
a problem that is inflated by the backlog at the USPTO, it may also be 
contributing to the problem, as developers file multiple frivolous 
patents in order to create a patent portfolio, thereby clogging an 
already overworked system. 
Third, obstructing generic market entry keeps drug prices high and 
reduces access to important drugs.45 Once a generic drug hits the 
market, consumers typically pay around twenty percent of the brand-
name equivalent’s cost.46 The brand-name drug at issue in Novartis, 
for example, cost a consumer in India $2,666 per month.47 The 
 
38 FTC, supra note 14, at 14−15. 
39 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
40 Kapczynski, Park & Sampat, supra note 17, at 8. 
41 Id. 
42 Richard Posner, Why there are too many patents in America, THE ATLANTIC (July 
12, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many           
-patents-in-america/259725/. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., (Apr. 1, 2013) SCR, Civil appeal No. 
2728 (India). 
46 Nadia, The Clinical and Financial Value of Evergreened Drugs, MEDTIPSTER (Aug. 
31, 2011), http://www.medtipster.com/blog/?p=720. 
47 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., (Apr. 1, 2013) SCR, Civil appeal No. 2728 
(India). 
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generic equivalent in India would cost the same consumer between 
$177 and $266 per month.48 
Alternatively, some commenters argue that patent holders should 
be allowed to evergreen in an effort to recoup the high cost of 
developing a drug.49 This argument rests on the premise that because 
the Hatch-Waxman Act has promoted generic market entry, 
pharmaceutical innovation has decreased, and development costs 
continue to rise.50 It is true that a drug’s patent term often partially 
expires while the drug is within the FDA testing phase.51 And a large 
portion of development costs for a pharmaceutical are incurred in 
development and in testing and approval for sale by the FDA, all of 
which occurs before the drug enters the market.52 Another cost that a 
pharmaceutical developer must bear are services that pharmaceutical 
companies must provide in addition to the actual production of the 
drug: the first entrants in the market are tasked with educating 
physicians on the drug and safety and efficacy testing.53 Therefore, 
evergreening strategies are an important element of a developer’s 
attempt to recoup costs, which in turn could further innovation by 
providing the funds necessary for future development.54 
Several responses indicate that this argument may not be entirely 
compelling. First, evergreening reduces certainty to consumers who 
lack the means to afford brand-name drugs.55 Because secondary 
patents are often frivolous, they are susceptible to challenge.56 
Whether or not this challenge will occur necessarily determines the 
speed at which access can be given. Therefore, this system of 
 
48 Id. 
49 See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MED. & ENT. L.J. 245. 
50 Id. at 260. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 267−68 (explaining that Big Brand Pharma must pay the cost of development, 
educating physicians, safety and testing efficacy, and the rising costs of products liability 
litigation while generics manufacturers do not). 
54 Id. at 272. 
55 See Michael R. Herman, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic 
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV.  1788, 1819 (2011). 
56 Kapczynski, Park & Sampat, supra note 17, at 7−8. 
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strategies decreases the predictability to the end user of when a drug 
will be available.57 
Second, if the problem truly lies in the need for additional time to 
recoup development expenses, then this strategy is not the proper 
solution. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows for a five-year patent term 
extension in order to compensate for testing, allowing for a 
pharmaceutical patent’s term to extend to fourteen years from FDA 
approval for marketing.58 Granted, this is three years less than the 
average effective patent life of other science and technology 
advancements and does not allow enough time for the vast majority of 
drugs to make profits during the initial patent term.59 
Third, evergreening contravenes a primary purpose for protecting 
patents. Spurring innovation is one of the goals of protecting 
patents.60 As noted above, a majority of the time the secondary 
patents do not actually advance innovation because the core 
compound that the patent covers is virtually the same as the original 
patent.61 Essentially, patent layering allows for some protection with 
an incremental advancement on the original product, at best.62 
Secondary patents are often frivolous and are invalidated upon 
challenge because they focus on the drug’s peripheral aspects. While 
the necessity and appropriateness of the initial patent term is 
respected, the fact remains that our system allows secondary patents 
that may not actually advance a drug’s efficacy—an additional patent 
may extend protection beyond the level of innovation that the 
patentee has actually brought to the industry.63 Affording this 
 
57 See Michael R. Herman, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic 
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1788, 1819 (2011). 
58 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 1 56 (2013). 
59 Morris, supra note 49, at 268−69. 
60 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 1 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001). 
61 See Kapczynski, Park & Sampat, supra note 17, at 7−8. 
62 See id. 
63 Marc-Andrew Gagon & Joel Lerchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, PLOS MED. 5(1): e1, 
(2008) http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0050001. 
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protection without advancement in the industry does not incentivize 
innovation; it merely allows for an end-run in the legal system.64 
Because access to pharmaceuticals can literally be a matter of life 
and death for some patients, it is imperative that the law regulating 
pharmaceuticals be vigilantly analyzed and updated to make certain 
that they make sense in light of both the effect pharmaceuticals can 
have in patients’ lives and the landscape facing pharmaceutical 
developers. 
II 
NOVARTIS AND THERAPEUTIC EFFICACY 
Before India joined the TRIPS agreement, India recognized the 
right to claim a patent on “an invention for a substance itself intended 
for use, or capable of being used, as medicine or drug.”65 Protection 
of this right was created by ordinance, but the ordinance would 
lapse.66 India eventually codified these protections into law after the 
United States and several European nations filed actions with the 
World Trade Organization and India faced trade sanctions for 
noncompliance with TRIPS sections 70(8) and (9).67 Under this 
pressure, India passed, albeit with rushed alterations, the Patents Act 
of 1970; however, the alterations in India’s law contained a 
component not found United States patent law—section 3(d) of the 
Patents Act of 1970. 
The Indian Supreme court, focusing on the purpose of section 3(d) 
in light of the history of patent law in India, found that a secondary 
patent is invalid unless it demonstrates an increase in therapeutic 
efficacy.68 In Novartis, a drug developer sought to gain patent 
protection for the beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate,69 a drug 
commonly known as Gleevec, which is used to treat leukemia.70 
 
64 Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: 
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence 
Requirement, 66 SMU L. REV. 59, 104−06 (2013). 
65 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., (2013) SCR, Civil appeal No. 2728, 33 
(India). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 94−96. 
69 Id. at 2−3. 
70 Id. 
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The original patent for Gleevec was found to be active in India in 
2003, when exclusive marketing rights were granted to Novartis.71 
But Indian drug producers had entered the market with several 
generic forms of the drug during the time between its original patent 
and the implementation of changes to Indian law to create compliance 
with the TRIPS agreement.72 The patent for Gleevec was filed in 1993 
and a secondary patent was filed in 1998 for the beta crystalline 
form.73 A similar application for a secondary patent was filed in the 
United States and approved after the Board of Patent Appeals 
overturned its rejection.74 Thus, if the court had ruled on whether the 
patents were in existence during the infringement period, the court 
would have found violations. 
However, the difference between Gleevec as imantib mesylate and 
its beta-crystalline form is a perfect example of a secondary patent 
that offers protection while only questionably advancing innovation in 
the field. Novartis identified three methods for producing the beta-
crystalline form from the substance identified in the original patent 
claim.75 The differences that Novartis’ application claimed existed 
between the two forms were more beneficial flow properties, better 
thermodynamic stability, and lower hygroscopicity, all factors that 
made the beta-crystalline form “new” because it stored better and was 
easier to process.76 Additionally, Novartis claimed the drug to be at 
least thirty percent more bioavailable.77 However, there was no direct 
claim at any point in the application that the beta-crystalline form was 
superior to Gleevec as protected in the initial patent.78 The court held 
that, essentially, the patent was made for an altered form of the drug 
that in no way altered the primary effect or substance in an innovative 
way.79 
The Indian Supreme Court thus denied the secondary patent on 
several grounds. The first ground was that the beta-crystalline form 
was not a new product resulting from an invention beyond the initial 
 
71 Id. at 96. 
72 Id. at 23. 
73 Id. at 7. 
74 Id. at 65−66. 
75 Id. at 3−5. 
76 Id. at 7. 
77 Id. at 87. 
78 Id. at 7. 
79 See id. 
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patent.80 Therefore, it failed to meet the test of “invention” as laid out 
in section 2(1)(j) and section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act of 1970.81 
The court went on to explore the meaning and application of section 
3(d) in this context.82 
The Indian Supreme Court’s determination of section 3(d)’s 
purpose relied on the literal meaning of the text and the legislative 
history.83 The court determined from debates during the passage of 
the amendments in 2005 that section 3(d)’s purposes are to prevent 
evergreening and to encourage incremental inventions.84 The court 
relied heavily on Indian patent law’s historic reluctance to protect 
pharmaceutical patents and statements from the sponsoring minister 
to the 2005 amendment.85 The court found that the minister’s 
following statement showed that evergreening was among the 
mischief to be remedied by the amendment: 
 In regard to evergreening, I just want to read out section 3(d) 
which says that a mere discovery of a new property or a new use for 
a known substance or the mere us of know process in a new 
product—these are exceptions, these will not be granted any 
patent—and substances obtained by a mere ad-mixture resulting 
only in aggregation of properties of the components thereof or, 
processes of producing such substances will not be given patents86 
Once evergreening was determined to be a primary concern of the 
amendment, the Novartis court went about defining section 3(d)’s 
terms, particularly its requirement of enhanced efficacy.87 “Efficacy” 
in section 3(d) refers to therapeutic efficacy.88 The court first 
determined the threshold that a patent must meet in order for section 
3(d) to apply.89 This threshold is that (1) the second substance is a 
new form of previously known substance and (2) the efficacy of the 
first substance is known.90 Once this threshold is triggered, the patent 
applicant must meet the standard as set forth in section 3(d). The text 
 
80 Id. at 82. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 38. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 40. 
87 Id. at 82−90. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 82. 
90 Id. 
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of the test in section 3(d) is as follows: “The mere discovery of a new 
form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement 
of the known efficacy of that substance . . . [is not an invention within 
the meaning of the Act].”91 This text is followed promptly by an 
explanatory section that reads: 
For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, 
metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, 
complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of know substance 
shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ 
significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.92 
The court was clear that “efficacy” was the aspect of the substance 
that must be improved to pass the hurdle of filing a secondary 
pharmaceutical patent.93 However, the court had to determine exactly 
what “efficacy” meant. 
The court first used the dictionary meaning of the word: “efficacy” 
means “the ability to produce a desired or intended result.”94 
Therefore, the efficacy of the second substance would naturally 
depend on the purpose of the product under consideration. That 
means that in the pharmaceutical context, where drugs are aimed at 
curing diseases, the best measure of efficacy would be therapeutic 
efficacy.95 The court next questioned how to determine one 
substance’s advantage over those of another substance in terms of 
therapeutic efficacy.96 The court also determined that in light of the 
historic preference against evergreening, a court should consider 
efficacy narrowly.97 
Within this inquiry, the court noted that when dealing with 
pharmaceutical substances certain properties coincide with the 
substance’s particular form.98 For example, an alteration of a salt’s 
properties cannot be considered “invention” unless it alters the drug’s 
therapeutic effect.99 Therefore, in certain circumstances, altering the 
substance’s form would increase its efficacy if the second substance 
 
91 Id. at 90. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 90−91. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 91. 
99 See id. 
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were more effective in curing the target disease. The court then 
determined that the second patent application was invalid because the 
applicant had demonstrated no evidence that the beta-crystalline form 
of Gleevec increased therapeutic efficacy.100 
III 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Article requires also a brief discussion of pharmaceutical 
patent standards in the United States. First, this section will look at 
several rationales for protecting the market right. Second, the section 
will look at the judicially recognized purpose of the Intellectual 
Property Clause and its relationship to patent protection. An 
examination of the clause’s purpose will necessarily direct a look at 
the current statutory standard. By setting this framework, the paper 
will advance an argument for how the concepts found in Novartis can 
assist in meaningful change to the U. S. patent system. 
There are four primary approaches to understanding why we 
protect intellectual property.101 These approaches are: (1) the 
utilitarian rationale, (2) the idea that people ought to be rewarded for 
the fruits of their labor, (3) the theory that intellectual property rights 
satisfy a fundamental human need, and (4) the aspirational theory—
intellectual property rights should be protected in a manner that 
cultivates a just and attractive society.102 
The first and fourth of these approaches underscore the potential 
downside of patent layering. The utilitarian rationale attempts to 
create balance between social need and market reality.103 Under this 
rationale, the incentive to create is the exclusive market right.104 The 
exclusive market right gives the inventor an opportunity to recoup the 
cost of developing the intellectual property.105 This protection must be 
weighed against social utility.106 As explained before, this balance is 
greatly tested by evergreening. And by looking at this issue using the 
aspirational theory as a lens, it is apparent that a practice that reduces 
 
100 Id. 
101 Fisher, supra note 60. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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access to medicines, as the empirical data above suggests, should be 
carefully examined to ensure that our patent system does not over-
privilege one group at the expense of the rest of society. As explained 
below, the motivation for protecting patent rights in the United States 
does not adhere strictly to any of the approaches. 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to create laws “[t]o 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.”107 The Intellectual Property 
Clause has been the subject of differing interpretations by the courts. 
Despite the seeming lack of guidance in the language itself, over 
time the judiciary has provided insight into the Clause’s purpose. 
There are two primary competing interests that could be served by the 
“limited times” language, and courts have interpreted the Clause to 
protect both.108 The first grants the inventor the exclusive right to the 
intellectual property, which promotes advancement by providing a 
monetary incentive.109 The second interest is the introduction of the 
invention into the public domain—an introduction that promotes the 
clause’s purpose through establishing a higher baseline for inventors 
to work from.110 However, the text does not discern which of the 
competing interests should be favored and, more importantly, 
provides little guidance on the limited nature of that right.111 
Indeed, this statement was initially interpreted to mean that the 
promotion of science and the useful arts was best served by protecting 
individual property rights: 
 The securing to inventors of an exclusive right to their 
inventions, was deemed of so much importance, as a means of 
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, that the 
Constitution has expressly delegated to Congress the power to 
secure such rights to them for a limited period. The inventor has, 
during this period, a property in his inventions: a property which is 
often of very great value, and of which the law intended to give him 
the absolute enjoyment and possession.112 
 
107 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
108 See Ex Parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824); see Pennock v. Dialogue, 
27 U.S. 1, 23−24 (1829). 
109 See Ex Parte Wood, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824). 
110 See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23−24 (1829). 
111 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
112 Ex Parte Wood, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824). 
MARRS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2017  10:27 AM 
2016] Forever Green? An Examination of Pharmaceutical 95 
Patent Extensions 
Theoretically, granting an exclusive property right would 
incentivize innovation. 
Just five years after the Court recognized an inventor’s exclusive 
right to his or her intellectual property, the Court explored the value 
of introducing patented objects into the public domain.113 In 
emphasizing the “limited period” language of the clause, Justice Story 
recognized a balance between the goals of “stimulating the efforts of 
genius” and promoting “the progress of science and useful arts,” 
which Justice Story concluded can be achieved “by giving the public 
at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at 
as early a period as possible.”114 In recognizing this balance, Justice 
Story illuminates another potential manner in which patent laws can 
promote science and the useful arts: by limiting patent term length, 
new ideas will thereby enter the public domain and provide 
subsequent inventors with a heightened baseline from which to 
innovate.115 Despite the Court’s recognition of the “limited time” 
language requiring some limit, courts have declined to set such a 
limit, instead deferring to lawmakers.116 
The U.S. Patent Act creates three primary requirements for 
patentability: the invention must be useful;117 the invention must be 
novel;118 and the invention must be non-obvious.119 Of these statutory 
requirements, the novelty and non-obviousness requirements present 
 
113 See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23−24 (1829). 
114 Id. at 19. 
115 See id. 
116 Id.; see Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 297, 325−28 (2004) (discussing judicial limits on the Intellectual 
Property Clause). 
117 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (explaining that an invention is “useful” if it provides some 
identifiable benefit and is capable of use); see Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (1817) 
(showing this requirement is not as important in the discussion presented in this paper 
because the patents in question are all likely useful). 
118 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015). (showing the “novelty” requirement exists to protect the 
public’s right to use inventions that are already in the public domain. This is particularly 
complicated in the area of patent applications involving chemical compounds.). See also 
Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 932−58 (2011). 
119 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1052) (explaining non-obviousness is satisfied if “the differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a 
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains”). 
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unique issues that can affect initial approval and/or a subsequent 
challenge of a pharmaceutical patent.120 
Once a patent has been approved, courts are statutorily required to 
assume its validity.121 This presumption places the burden on the 
challenger to prove that a patent is, for instance, non-obvious.122 
Combined with the fact that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is 
under-resourced, frivolous patents may be allowed to slip through, 
and there may be little ex ante incentive for a generic drug producer 
to attempt to enter the market.123 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, however, altered the pharmaceutical 
patent landscape in 1983 and again in 2003, with the goal of 
increasing generic competition while also preserving incentives to 
innovate.124 The Hatch-Waxman Act gave generics an easier and 
quicker method of market entry by incentivizing generic drug 
production.125 For example, a generic manufacturer is allowed to use a 
developer’s safety and efficacy data in seeking approval, and 180-day 
market exclusivity is granted to the first generic manufacturer to file 
an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).126 This was not 
allowed before the ANDA process established by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, however, also works against generic 
market entry. The Act creates new wrinkles in the original patent life 
of a pharmaceutical.127 For example, it allows for an extension of the 
original patent term for five years, provided that the total term does 
not exceed fourteen years from FDA approval to market.128 
Furthermore, there has been a correlation between evergreening 
 
120 Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 932−58 
(2011) (for a description of novelty challenges); Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s 
New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 79 (2013) 
(for a description of the non-obviousness requirement). 
121 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
122 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (2007). 
123 Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 992 
(2013); see also Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management 
After KSP v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 286−89 (2008). 
124 Wendy H. Schacht, RL32377, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS THE “HATCH-
WAXMAN” ACT: SELECTED PATENT- RELATED ISSUES, Apr. 1, 2002. 
125 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016). 
126 Id. 
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2015). 
128 Id. 
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strategies and the implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a fact 
suggesting that the amendments to prior patent law have actually 
caused the emergence of evergreening strategies.129 
IV 
A MODEST SUGGESTION FOR AN ALTERATION 
The most recent large-scale adjustments to U.S. pharmaceutical 
patent law attempted to strike a balance between access to 
pharmaceuticals—in the form of incentives to generic drug 
manufacturers—and the incentive to develop drugs. 130 This alteration 
did not directly address evergreening; pharmaceutical patent law may 
need further alteration to eliminate this practice. There are several 
alterations that could be made to the patent laws that could eliminate 
patent layering, and any amendments should consider the addition of 
a provision similar to India’s section 3(d). 
The first change that could be made is the elimination of additional 
30-month stays after a generic company has made a paragraph IV 
certification and the patent holder answers with an infringement 
suit.131 A second addition to the patent system could be a right of 
action to challenge the validity of the secondary patent in the same 
proceeding as the infringement suit.132 These changes would reduce 
the potential for abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s provisions 
without potentially stifling innovation. And, when combined with a 
standard similar to section 3(d), these changes could eliminate the 
additional protection afforded to secondary patents that would 
eventually be found invalid anyway. 
Adopting an enhanced efficacy standard that would prevent patent 
protection for frivolous patents yet still afford it to those patents that 
are truly innovative proves a difficult task.  Such an endeavor raises 
questions both of what the required showing for a patent holder would 
be and at what stage in the process the showing would have to be 
made. The showing required by Novartis is that the secondary patent 
manifests an increase in therapeutic efficacy over the prior 
 
129 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 16, at 619−20. 
130 FTC, supra note 14, at i. 
131 FTC, supra note 14, at iii−v. 
132 Id. 
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incantation.133 This narrow interpretation of enhanced efficacy 
prioritizes the clinical outcome of the drug without considering 
protection for changes to the drug that improve it in other ways.134 
Even though it is narrow, this requirement is appropriate if the 
showing it requires occurs at the correct point in the litigation process. 
If a generic producer makes a paragraph IV certification and a 
patent holder attempts to string additional 30-month stays together, 
either through a later filed patent or a version 2.0 of the drug, that 
patent holder should be required to make a showing, in front of the 
same court deciding the infringement suit, that the later filed patent 
has enhanced therapeutic efficacy. If the patent holder cannot produce 
evidence that the secondary patent does meet that requirement, then 
the additional 30-month stay should be denied. 
 
 
133 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., (2013) SCR, Civil appeal No. 2728, 98-100 
(India). 
134 Du, supra note 2, at 252. 
